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Abstract
This paper investigates the effects of the sources of candidates’ campaign funding on
their electoral outcomes, with particular emphasis on whether candidates who rely on
a narrow base of funding suffer adverse electoral consequences. An extensive dataset
consisting of over 650,000 contributions to House candidates in elections from 1980 to
1992 is used. The results reveal a negative relationship between the concentration of
contributions and voteshare for open seat candidates and challengers. This may have
significant implications for some of the empirical premises underlying the US Supreme
Court’s landmark Buckley v. Valeo decision. At very least the finding is an important
stylized fact about US elections which is robust over the 1980’s and early 1990’s. Keywords:
Campaign Contributions; Campaign Finance J.E.L. classification: D72; K39
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1. Introduction
The impact of campaign spending on electoral outcomes has been the focus of an extensive
empirical literature (e.g. Jacobson 1978, 1990; Abramovitz, 1988; Green and Krasno, 1988;
Gerber, 1998; Erikson and Palfrey, 1998). However, most of these studies have been
concerned with the effects of a candidate’s aggregate spending; with the exception of Palda
and Palda (1998), little attention has been paid to whether the sources and dispersion of
a candidate’s campaign funding influence their electoral outcomes. 1 The relative lack of
attention to this issue is somewhat surprising, in view of its possible implications for one
of the central issues in US campaign finance jurisprudence. In 1976, the US Supreme
Court ruled in its landmark Buckley v. Valeo 2 decision that, while the overall level of
spending by a candidate can be considered a form of speech and thus could not be regulated,
contributions were subject to regulation because donations do not constitute a form of speech
by contributors. This ruling has played a crucial role in the development of the current
campaign finance system, and has given rise to a substantial academic and popular literature. 3
Virtually all of the scholarly discussion of the merits of the Court’s reasoning has taken
place within the discourse of constitutional law, with reference to abstract legal principles.
However, the decision rests, in part, on a number of premises (both implicit and explicit)
which are indisputably empirical in nature. This paper represents a new departure, in that
it discusses Buckley from an empirical perspective. In particular, it seeks to clarify the
empirical premises on which the conclusion (that campaign contributions are not a form of
speech) rests, and to confront these hypotheses with empirical evidence. The fundamental
idea of this endeavor is that, if an empirical link can be established between the sources of
a candidate’s contributions and that candidate’s share of the vote, then a case can be made
that contributions are a form of speech.
In pursuing this aim, this paper employs an extensive dataset consisting of PAC contribu-
1Depken (1998) uses data from the 1996 Congressional elections to examine the relative effects of contributions
from PACs, individuals, and parties on voteshares. Palda (1997) did this for the 1990 House elections. However,
neither of these authors looked at the dispersion of contributions, which is the main focus of this paper.
2424 U.S. 1 (1976).
3For instance, Moore (1980) estimates that complying with contributions regulations costs candidates up to
10% of their budgets; this amounts to hundreds of millions in election years.3
tions (totaling 650,224 donations) to House candidates in elections from 1980 to 1992. This
micro-level data facilitates the calculation of concentration indices which measure the degree
to which a candidate’s funding is derived from a narrow or broad range of donors. 4 The
empirical findings suggest that there is a strong negative relationship between the concentra-
tion of candidates’ funding sources and their electoral success for challengers and open seat
candidates. The relationship for incumbents is either insignificant or weakly positive. This
relationship has wide-ranging implications, not only for campaign finance regulation (as noted
above), but also for theoretical models in the political economy literature, and for public
debates surrounding campaign finance law. Theoretical models of campaign expenditures
(e.g. Austen-Smith, 1987; Grossman and Helpman, 1996) typically assume that the effects
of spending by candidates are independent of the source of the funds. The results in this
paper may provide some grounds for modifying this approach. In addition, they appear to
suggest that popular concerns regarding the influence of money on politics may be somewhat
misplaced; to the extent that voters react adversely to candidates who rely on narrow sources
of funding, there would seem to be "intrinsic" limits to the power of interest groups to
influence politics through campaign contributions.
Of course, it is possible that the direction of causality may run in the other direction
(i.e. that candidates who are expected to receive a high voteshare receive a wider range of
contributions). This simultaneity issue plagues the entire literature on campaign spending and
electoral outcomes. Some researchers have concluded that no statistical solution is possible
(e.g. Jacobson, 1990), while others have sought to use instrumental variables (e.g. Gerber,
1998), or to achieve identification through covariance restrictions (Erikson and Palfrey, 1998).
This paper is primarily intended to present this hitherto unknown finding of a relationship
between campaign contribution sources and voteshare. It does not claim that the causal link
is solely from contributions to votes. However, the above remarks regarding Buckley only
require that the entire relationship is accounted for by the effect of anticipated voteshare
on contributions. It remains for future research to disentangle the two simultaneous effects;
however, the existence of the relationship highlighted in this paper appears to be interesting
4Kroszner and Stratmann (1998) also calculate analogous concentration indices; however, they use them as
measures of politicians’ strategies in seeking contributions from interest groups, rather than as a determinant of
electoral outcomes.4
in its own right. Even if there is disagreement over our interpretation of the negative relation
between concentration of contributions and a candidate’s voteshare, the present paper can be
seen as contributing a "stylized fact" about the relation between these two variables which
has not been previously recorded and for which we find robust, long- term evidence.
In Section 2, the US Supreme Court’s view, as expressed in its Buckley opinion, on
the relationship between campaign contributions and political speech is explored, and some
recent legal commentary on the case by constitutional scholars is briefly reviewed. Then, the
empirical premises which are implicit in the Court’s reasoning are identified, and formulated
as testable hypotheses. Section 3 introduces some theoretical issues that bear on the links
between voteshare and the dispersion and sources of contributions. The data (on House
elections during presidential years since 1980) is described in Section 4. The results are
presented in Section 5, and section 6 concludes the paper.
2. Contributions and speech
This section reviews and briefly discusses the Buckley decision (Section 2.1), and outlines
some of the main lines of legal commentary which constitutional scholars have put forward
(Section 2.2). Then (in Section 2.3), it proceeds to introduce a novel approach to analyzing
the issues raised by the case - namely, drawing out the empirical claims implicit in the
Court’s reasoning, and stating them in the form of testable hypotheses.
2.1 The Buckley decision
In 1974, Congress passed major amendments to the Federal Election Campaign Act
(FECA), seeking to regulate campaign expenditures and contributions. These measures were
subsequently challenged by a wide range of political figures. In Buckley v. Valeo, the
Supreme Court decided this challenge by invalidating the regulation of expenditures on
First Amendment grounds, while upholding the regulation of contributions. It is the latter
aspect of the decision on which this paper focuses. The relationship between speech and
the transmission of information, as envisaged by the Court, is explained in the following
passages:
A restriction on the amount of money a person or a group can spend on political5
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration and the size
of the audience reached. This is because virtually every means of communicating
ideas in today’s mass society requires expenditure of money (634-635)
However, in the Court’s view, contributions do not transmit such information:
By contrast with a limitation upon expenditures for political expression, a
limitation upon the amount that any one person or groups may contribute to
a candidate or political committee entails only a marginal restriction upon the
contributor’s ability to engage in free communication. A contribution serves as
a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not
increase perceptibly with the size of his contribution since the expression rests
solely on the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of
the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contributor’s
support for the candidate...While contributions may result in political expression
if spent by a candidate...the transformation of contributions into political debate
involves speech by someone other than the contributor (635-636).
The Court appears to be arguing that there is a first order effect to contributing ("expression
rests solely on the . . . symbolic act of contributing"), with the size of the contribution
giving little extra information ("a very rough index") to the observer. This feature, in the
Court’s view, distinguishes contributions from campaign spending. According to this view,
the informational value to a voter of learning that the Sierra Club had contributed to the
campaign of a particular candidate would essentially be exhausted by the knowledge that the
donation had been made; the amount contributed would be irrelevant.
2.2 Legal commentary on Buckley
In view of its central importance in US campaign finance jurisprudence, Buckley has
given rise to a large volume of legal commentary by constitutional scholars. The literature
on this issue prior to 1992 has been reviewed in Palda (1994). Since then, interest in the
topic of campaign finance has grown even further. One prominent theme that stands out6
in the recent legal literature is the continuing criticism of the distinction between campaign
spending (as a form of speech) and contributions (as non-speech). For instance, Levit (1993,
p. 474) argues that the distinction between contributions and spending "does not hold up to
close analysis". Most of the critiques of the Buckley position tend to agree with the view
that contributions are not a form of speech, but argue that campaign spending is worthy
of no greater constitutional protection than the Court accorded to campaign donations (e.g.
Sunstein, 1994).
In sharp contrast, Smith (1997) argues that the Court permitted Congress too much scope
for regulating campaign finance in Buckley. In his view, contributions should be regarded
as a form of speech, and their regulation should thus be subject to ‘strict scrutiny’ (the most
stringent standard of judicial review in American constitutional jurisprudence). He claims
(pp. 48f) that as well as being a form of ‘conduct’, political donations are a form of ‘symbolic
speech’; this category of expression is generally granted First Amendment protection by the
courts in other contexts. Modern constitutional scholarship maintains that the government
can only regulate such conduct to prevent a harm that would arise even if the conduct had
no speech component. However, the alleged "harm" associated with campaign contributions
(corruption, or its appearance) would not occur if they did not communicate a message of
some sort.
Smith (1997) also challenges the Court’s main rationale for permitting government regu-
lation of contributions, which was to prevent corruption (the exchange of contributions for
policies or Congressional votes). Smith argues that the Court’s claim that contributions do not
warrant full protection because they do not communicate the "underlying basis of support"
contradicts its jurisprudence in other cases involving vague forms of speech (such as the
desecration of a flag); he suggests that the size of the contribution can often send a message
to the candidate about the donor’s beliefs.
2.3 Empirical implications of the Buckley decision
As the preceding discussion suggests, analysis of the Buckley decision has hitherto primarily
been undertaken from the standpoint of constitutional law, with a focus on abstract legal
principles. This paper presents an alternative approach, which seeks to identify and test the7
empirical premises and implications of the Court’s reasoning. The Court’s criteria for speech
can be used to formulate several testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis #1: The number of contributions received by a candidate may have a significant
effect on the candidate’s voteshare.
This relates to the Court’s notion that contributing is a symbolic act with no information
content beyond the fact that someone gave a contribution. This hypothesis can perhaps be
justified with reference to the idea that the number of contributions may act as an ‘opinion poll’
that conveys information. There is support for this notion from the research of McKelvey and
Ordeshook (1984, 1985). McKelvey and Ordeshook show that an uninformed voter can learn
from a sequence of polls approximately where a candidate stands on some straightforward
issues, such as whether military spending should be $1 billion, or $2 billion, or $3 billion.
In their experimental study, some of the students were told beforehand what positions the
imaginary candidates held, while others were left uninformed but were paid to study the polls
and learn the positions. They found that the number of uninformed subjects who correctly
identified the positions of imaginary candidates rose to 58% after the first poll, 79% in the
second, and 81% in the third and final poll. If contributions are viewed as a form of opinion
poll, then this analysis suggests that they may carry useful information and that limiting
them is more than "a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to engage in free
communication."
Unfortunately, a meaningful statistical test of this hypothesis is close to impossible.
Candidates with many contributions tend also to be candidates with many votes. Surveys of
US voters show that 8% of them contribute to elections. This means that a candidate with
many votes will benefit from a large fraction of the 8% contributing. At best, a test of a
statistical relation between the number of contributions and the number of votes would not
reject the above hypothesis. These considerations however are of minor importance to the
theme of the present paper, which is to propose that the Supreme Court may not have fully
accounted for all the ways in which contributions may transmit information. It is these other
ways in which contributions transmit information to which our statistical inquiries will be
directed.
Wittman (1989) has pointed to one form of information latent in contributions, which the
Supreme Court has ignored. He argues that campaign contributions are endorsements that8
carry information and that there is information in the amount of money spent on a campaign,
independently of how that money is spent. In Wittman’s (1989, pp.1400-1401) view:
Voters can also look at the list of campaign contributors (who typically make
their endorsements public) and infer the characteristics of the candidates’ policies
(pro or con). That is, interest group endorsements are like signals in the market
and provide strong cues about candidates’ preferences.
Unfortunately, this is not a testable hypothesis as present data available to research- ers simply
show how much money the candidate spent, and not the information content of messages
that were sent out. To date no researchers have tried to disentangle the amount spent from
the information content of the message. There is however a testable implication latent in
Wittman’s comments; namely that the fraction of funds a candidate receives from differing
groups may influence that candidate’s votes. A candidate who relies heavily on funding from
ecological groups may send a signal to voters that he or she is a friend of nature. The
Supreme Court recognized no such a possibility in Buckley v. Valeo and so this leads us to
formulate the second hypothesis emerging from Buckley v. Valeo:
Hypothesis #2: If the Supreme Court’s view is correct, then we should find that the
share of a candidate’s contributions made up by any individual or group does not influence
a candidate’s votes.
On the surface, this appears to be a readily testable hypothesis. The Federal Election
Commission divides contributors into several seemingly intuitive categories (corporate PACs,
public interest PACs, individual contributors among others) and it is a simple matter to
regress candidate voteshares on the fraction of contributions he or she received from each
category of contributor. As we shall see in more detail in the empirical section, the are
flaws with the FEC classification which do not encourage confidence in the validity of such
a test. The FEC draws a distinction between contributions from political action committees
and contributions from private individuals, and yet, PACs are made up of private individual
contributions. It is hard to rate one source of contribution as being qualitatively different
from another and it is difficult to argue that voters should care about the FEC classifications.
These difficulties with the FEC classifications have led us to formulate a third hypothesis
emerging from the Buckley ruling; it is the testing of this hypothesis which is the lynchpin9
of the present paper.
Hypothesis #3: According to the Supreme Court, the dispersion of a candidate’s contri-
butions does not have a significant effect on that candidate’s voteshare (i.e. two otherwise
identical candidates who spend the same amount would receive identical voteshares, even if
one relies on a narrower range of funding sources).
The following section discusses why the dispersion of contributions may be an important
signal to voters, and why Hypothesis 3 seems to be the best avenue for testing the Supreme
Court’s claim that contributions are of minimal value as signals to voters.
3 Why should dispersion matter?
What emerges from the discussion above is that the validity of the Court’s empirical
hypotheses in Buckley depends crucially on whether voters respond to characteristics of a
candidate’s contributions other than the number of donors. This paper focuses especially on
the concentration of contributions, in order to test Hypothesis 3. This section sketches two
simple accounts of possible reasons why, taking the pattern of contributions as exogenously
given, voters may respond to the degree of dispersion of a candidate’s contributions. The
first (Section 3.1) involves a scenario in which interest groups are ‘benign’, in the sense
that their interests are identical to those of each other, and of the voters. However, the
groups have private information concerning how best to achieve the common aims; in these
circumstances, a candidate with more dispersed contribution sources may end up being better
informed. Section 3.2 considers an alternative case in which interest groups are seeking
private goods (such as subsidies) for themselves, where these groups’ interests are in conflict
with those of each other, and of the voters. It is shown that, in such a situation, it may
be the case that candidates with more dispersed contribution sources are less susceptible to
being captured by any one group, and thus may be preferred by voters. Finally, Section 3.3
considers other possibilities, notably that the pattern of contributions may itself be influenced
by anticipated voteshare.
2.1 The ’Informational’ Rationale
Suppose that there are n interest groups active in the political system. Prior to the election,10
they make (exogenous) donations Ci for i =1, 2, ..., n to a candidate. Following the election,
each group receives a private signal xi, which is a realization of an i.i.d. random variable
X with E[X]=0a n dVa r[X]=σ2. The groups then reveal this signal to the elected
candidate. The signal is assumed to be verifiable, so that no strategic behavior enters into the
revelation of the information. It is assumed that the signal is relevant for some policy-related
purpose, so that an accurate and precise estimate of X is desired by the elected candidate
(and, implicitly, by the voters). This setting is thus one in which all the interest groups, and
the voters, have identical interests (in terms of ‘better’ policy); however, the groups differ in
that each has private information regarding how best to achieve this common aim. 5
The effect of the campaign contributions, and, more generally, the nature of the implicit
‘exchange’ between donors and candidates have been the subject of much discussion in the
political economy literature. One theoretical approach, represented by Austen-Smith (1995),
models campaign contributions as a means of gaining access to legislators. In this vein, it
is assumed here that, if elected, the candidate weighs each group’s signal by the fraction of











for X. The following example may help clarify the scenario. Suppose that a number of
business, consumer, and environmental groups each have private information concerning the
likelihood of adverse consequences resulting from global warming. Furthermore, suppose
that representatives of each of these groups are ushered in for discussions with the elected
candidate (at which this private information is revealed), with the time devoted to each
meeting being proportional to the amount contributed by each group during the previous
election cycle. Following the discussions, the elected official forms an estimate of the
probability of adverse consequences, weighting each group’s information by the length of
time for which she was exposed to it.
5Note that this situation is somewhat akin to that in which analysis of the Condorcet Jury Theorem and other
issues relating to information aggregation have been undertaken in the political economy literature.11
As the legislator’s assessment of the value of X is assumed to be relevant for policymaking,
it is reasonable to assume further that voters will care about the statistical properties of W.
Clearly, W is unbiased:
E[W]=c1E[x1]+c2E[x2]+...+ cnE[xn] (3)
= 0 (4)
Consider the efficiency of W:
Va r[W]=Va r[c1x1]+Va r[c2x2]+...+ Va r[cnxn] (5)
= c1σ
2 + c2σ
2 + ...+ cnσ
2 (6)
It is clear that the minimum-variance estimator of X will be obtained when ci =1 /n for all
i; each group contributes the same fraction of the candidate’s campaign funds, so that the
dispersion of donations is maximized, and W is simply the sample mean. More generally,
the relative efficiency of W will depend on the degree of concentration of the contributions
received by the candidate. Voters will be wary of candidates who rely on concentrated
sources of contributions, because this may reduce the precision of the candidate’s estimates
of important policy-relevant variables. Thus, according to this view, a positive relationship
between dispersion of contributions and votes would be expected.
A standard measure of market concentration in the industrial organization and antitrust
literature is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). The expression

c2
i in the formula for
Va r[W] above is closely analogous to the HHI. It should be noted, however, that the HHI
is generally calculated using market share percentages (rather than proportions), and is by
convention (though not by theoretical necessity) often restricted to the four largest firms in
the industry. Modifying the HHI measure to use proportions, and to apply to all n interest










It follows that the lower is CCCI (so that contributions are less concentrated), the more
efficient is W (and, presumably, the more attractive the candidate is to voters). 3.2 The12
"Capture" Story (or the Madison-Montesquieu conjecture)
The discussion in Section 3.1 above assumed public-spirited interest groups seeking to
further the common good. This section considers a situation in which interest groups are self-
seeking, in that their aim is to obtain subsidies for themselves. This formulation introduces
direct conflicts between the interest groups, and between them and the voters (as the subsidies
are costly to the voters, in terms, for example, of increased taxes).
Suppose that there are n interest groups, each lobbying for a subsidy si where i ranges
from 1 to n. Following the election, the legislature will enact an n-dimensional vector of
subsidies   s. It is assumed that the legislature is organized in a decentralized manner (e.g.
Weingast and Marshall, 1988), whereby each legislator exercises exclusive proposal power
along one dimension of the policy vector. Consider a candidate who, if elected, exercises
jurisdiction over area i. This candidate will, if elected, effectively choose si (assuming for
the sake of simplicity that each proposal is adopted, through, for instance, a ‘universalistic’
norm of deference (e.g. Weingast, 1979)). The size of the subsidy indicates the degree to
which the candidate has been ‘captured’ by group i. Zelinsky (1993) and, more formally,
Dharmapala (1999) have argued that, in such circumstances, it may be the case that the larger
the number of groups engaged in lobbying, the more they will tend to counteract each other’s
efforts, and, hence, the lower the degree of capture.
Assume that the i’th interest group derives a benefit bi(  s) from the vector of subsidies,
with the benefits from increasing si being positive, and those from increasing subsidies to







for all j not equal to i. Prior to the election, the interest groups offer campaign contributions
to the candidate. Assume that the candidate who is expected to be allocated area i is always
lobbied by group i. In addition, suppose that this candidate is also lobbied by m other groups,
where m ≤ n − 1.
Following the election, the candidate, if successful, will choose si. Suppose that this
choice involves a cost c(si), which can be interpreted as representing a cost of (legislative)
effort, or a subsequent electoral cost (note that c (si) > 0 and c  (si) > 0. The joint surplus13




bj(si) − c(si) (9)
where the lobby groups other than i have (without loss of generality) been numbered












Note that the second term on the LHS is negative (as each term in the sum is negative).
Moreover, as m increases, the sum becomes more negative. Thus, c  (s∗
i) is decreasing in m.
As c  (s∗
i) > 0, this implies that s∗
i is also decreasing in m. Hence, the larger the number of
interest groups lobbying the candidate, the lower will be the equilibrium subsidy to group i.
As voters are harmed by the subsidies, they will prefer candidates with a greater variety of
contributors. This is a more modern formulation of Madison’s belief, as stated in Federalist
10, that the best way of preserving a democracy against factionalism was to have many
opposing groups under one national government. Antecedents to this view can also be found
in the writings of Montesquieu.
3.3 Other possibilities
The discussion in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 above took the behavior of interest groups as
given, and focused on the reactions of voters to variations in the diversity of a candidate’s
contribution sources. A more general framework, however, has to take into account the
possibility that campaign donors may be influenced by the voteshare which the candidate
is expected to receive, or that they may respond to some underlying characteristics of the
candidate (e.g. candidate "quality") which also affect the behavior of voters. For instance,
the groups in Section 3.2 are likely to discount the anticipated subsidies by the candidate’s
probability of victory, and would thus wish to focus their lobbying efforts on candidates
who are expected to win. In such a scenario, it would not be clear whether contributions
were being driven by anticipated votes, or votes by the characteristics of contributions. This
6See Dharmapala (1999) for more extensive discussions of models of this type, and the nature of the
interaction between the lobbyists and the politician.14
point is closely related to the simultaneity issue highlighted earlier - it provides a theoretical
underpinning for the empirical possibility that causality may run in both directions. While
this caveat must be borne in mind, the models sketched in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 nonetheless
illustrate some of the reasons why voters may respond to the dispersion of candidates’
campaign contributions.
4. The data
This study uses data for all House elections between 1980 and 1992 to investigate whether
there is a link between the sources of contributions and voteshares (to test Hypothesis 2), and
measures of the dispersion of candidate contributions and voteshares (to test Hypothesis 3).
The principal focus is on the latter hypothesis (because of weaknesses in the data pertaining
to Hypothesis 2 discussed in Section 2) and it is this hypothesis on which most of the
discussion is focused.
Measures of candidate votes are, of course, readily available. On the other hand, measures
of the dispersion of candidate contributions have not previously been constructed in the
literature on the determinants of candidate votes. The measure of dispersion we use is a
Herfindahl-type index. As discussed in Section 3.1, such an index falls directly out of a
simple theoretical model explaining the signaling value in contributions. As also mentioned
in Section 3.1, the Herfindahl index for a single candidate is calculated as follows (where
CCCI stands for campaign contribution concentration index, and n stands for the number of










Hay and Morris (1979) explain that the Herfindahl index is directly related to the concentration
curve of an industry. A concentration curve measures the cumulative market share of the
largest firm, the first and second largest firms, the first second and third largest firms, and
so on. The steeper is the concentration curve along any of its segments, the greater is
the Herfindahl index. It is important to distinguish between this index and the variance of
contributions, which appears to be another plausible dispersion measure. A high variance of
contributions does not necessarily indicate that a candidate’s contributions are not concentrated.15
Following the discussion of the Herfindahl index in Hay and Morris (1979), the CCCI is






where n is the number of contributions to a candidate and σ is the standard deviation
of contributions to the candidate. This means that ceteris paribus the concentration of a
candidate’s contributions increases with the variance of that candidates contributions. The
role of the number of contributions is ambiguous in the above measure and depends on the
degree of dispersion. If all contributions are of the same size so that the variance is zero,
CCCI becomes the reciprocal of the number of contributions and we get the highly intuitive
result that concentration diminishes as the number of donors increases. When variance is
high, a rise in the number of contributions of all sizes can raise concentration, as the weight
of large contributions dominates the weight of small contributions in the index. This is why
variance is not a meaningful measure of dispersion in the context of this paper’s treatment
of dispersion.
We constructed the Herfindahl measures from Federal Election Commission data tapes
listing the source of each candidate’s contributions. In principles, these contributions may come
from individuals (the law strongly encourages, though does not formally oblige, candidates
to record the source of all individual contributions above $200) or from political action
committees (PACs). Our datasets provided only rudimentary information on individuals which
did not allow them to be included in the Herfindahl measures. Our Herfindahl measures
focused on PACs. There are as many "records" (i.e. observations) on PAC contributions
for each candidate as there are PAC filers making contributions in the campaign. Table 1
reports the number of filers recorded on the FEC tapes for each of the election years covered
by this study.
For each election year, the dispersion measures for candidates were calculated by analyzing
approximately 100,000 data points. For example, to calculate the Herfindahl index of
contributions to Rep. George J. Hochbrueckner in the New York First Congressional district
race in 1986, data on the 98 filers who contributed to his campaign was analyzed, yielding
the statistics that his average PAC contribution was $2,556, the sum of his contributions was
$250,563, and the standard deviation of PAC contributions to Hochbrueckner was $2,960.16
This procedure was repeated for each candidate in the 1986 election. Tables 2(a)-(b) shows
the averages over incumbents, challengers, and open seat candidates of the candidate campaign
contribution concentration index (CCCI) for each election, as well as the average of standard
deviations of contributions over candidates (one measure of standard deviation calculated for
each candidate) and mean number of contributions to which the CCCI is related (as spelled
out in equation 12 above). The sample consists of Democratic and Republican candidates,
with third party candidates, independents, and candidates in primary elections in Louisiana
being excluded.
Table 2(a) shows that, using the Herfindahl index, incumbents have less concentrated
contributions than do challengers in all years. Candidates vying for open seats also have
less concentrated contributions than challengers, and overall are even less concentrated than
incumbents. In calculations not shown here, it was found that the difference between
challenger and incumbent Herfindahl indexes was statistically significant in almost all cases.
One of the puzzling features of Table 2(b) (and Table 1) is that the number of contributions
as counted by the Federal Election Commission is small; it seems difficult to reconcile the
111,891 contributions given in the 1992 House elections with survey data indicating that
nearly 8% of Americans give money to candidates and parties. The explanation is that in our
sample, all the contributions candidates receive come from political committees, so called
PACs. PACs bundle what may be the contributions of hundreds of people and hand them as
a single contribution to a candidate or party. This bundling accounts for what appears to be
a small number of contributors. The existence of bundling may also raise questions about
the usefulness of our campaign contribution concentration index CCCI. If there is a broad
variability in the bundling of PAC contributions candidates receive, the CCCI may be a very
noisy measure of contribution concentration. However, as individuals who contribute to the
same PAC perceive that they have common interests, bundling may not pose a significant
problem for the CCCI measure, as what is important is the concentration of contributions
from different interests, rather than different individuals per se.
5. The results
It was hypothesized earlier that there should be a negative structural relation between17
the dispersion of contributions and a candidate’s voteshare: the more dispersed a candidate’s
contributions, the greater will be the candidate’s share of the popular vote. Correlations will
not reveal structural relations, but may indicate that an association exists. Figure 1 shows
the correlations between candidate voteshares and the Herfindahl index weighted by what
percentage of his incoming funds a candidate received from PACs. This weight is necessary
to make the concentration indices of candidates comparable. A candidate may have extremely
concentrated contributions from PACs but may receive little of his overall revenue from
PACs. Voters would then tend not to be worried by his high Herfindahl index calculated
over PACs because PACs are a small part of his contributors. The weighted Herfindahl
index takes this possibility into account. This is also an indirect way of taking into account
our omission of individual contributions in the Herfindahl index.
Figure 1 shows that a consistent negative association of concentration with votes for
both challengers and open seat candidates. In other words, the higher the index (i.e. the
more concentrated are contributions) the fewer votes a candidate is likely to receive. The
significance levels of the correlations are shown in rows nine, and seventeen of Table 3. In
all except one election are the correlations significant and in the hypothesized direction. This
supports the conjecture of Hypothesis 3 about the relationship between dispersion and votes
that was described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. Consequently, this finding appears to contradict the
Supreme Court’s Buckley reasoning on the relationship between contributions and information.
However, there is no significant result for incumbents. If anything, there seems to be a
positive relationship between contribution concentration and voteshares for incumbents, albeit
statistically insignificant at conventionally accepted levels in half the elections (see row 1 of
Table 3). While it may be premature to speculate on correlations without further analysis,
one possible explanation for the lack of correlation between concentration of contribution and
voteshares for incumbents is that voters do not need to look at the dispersion of incumbent
contributions to obtain information on how beholden an incumbent is to special interests.
Voters know less about challengers and open seat candidates than they know about incumbents
and may look at the dispersion of contributions for guidance. This may explain the strong
and consistent significance of results for challengers and open seat candidates.
To account for the possibility that voters also respond to the concentration from the type
of PAC which contributes to a candidate, we have calculated separate Herfindahl measures18
for each of the seven categories into which the Federal Election Commission separates PAC
contributions. Figures 2(b) and 2(c) show that for challengers and open seat candidates,
the relation remains largely negative over the 1980- 1992 period, whereas for incumbents
it remains largely positive. Table 3 indicates significance levels and once again shows a
more predominant pattern of significance for challengers and open seat candidates than for
incumbents. Yet the signs of the correlations are not as persistently significant in the case
of challengers and open seat candidates as in the case of the Herfindahl index covering
all categories of PAC. The implication may be that voters do not distinguish between FEC
category when integrating concentration into their decisions on how to vote for a candidate.
This result underscores our skepticism of the meaning for voters of FEC classifications. This
skepticism is further confirmed in the analysis of regressions that follows.
Correlations by themselves are no proof of causation; however, as mentioned earlier, to
re-open the debate on the Supreme Court’s insistence that contributions are not a source of
information, it is not essential to disentangle the precise structural effects of dispersion of
contributions on votes. We simply have to show that there is a link in the data between the
two and that this link is not due to spurious relation to some third variable not included in
the analysis. While it would be ideal to be able to specify a full structural model of votes
and contributions, no model of this sort has come to be generally accepted in the literature to
date. Moreover, Milyo (1998) has recently developed a comprehensive critique of the whole
effort to identify the structural parameters of a votes-spending relation. He argues that there
are no satisfactory instruments that allow a structural interpretation of estimated parameters,
and that the best approach to discerning a relation between votes and spending lies in the
analysis of data generated by extreme electoral situations he describes as natural political
experiments.
Our compromise between correlations and searching for the ideal structural model has been
simply to estimate OLS regressions (without taking into account questions of simultaneity) as
a first step in investigating whether interesting results emerge which can later be subjected to
further scrutiny using more elaborate techniques. This is a procedure to which many authors
in recent academic work on the topic have resorted, in view of the apparent intractability
of the simultaneity problem. We present these regressions in Tables A1-A3 of the appendix
because we believe they send a valuable message. In spite of potential biases that may exist19
due to possible correlations between error terms and independent variables, the same though
somewhat weaker association emerges over 1980-1992 between the Herfindahl index and
voteshares as was found in the simple correlations.
The dependent variable in these regressions is the voteshare of incumbents, challengers,
or open seat candidates. Votes are assumed to be a function of the candidate’s campaign
expenditure divided by his or her expenditure plus the expenditure of his opponent. This is
the influence variable (called "candidate spending as a fraction of all candidate spending"
in Tables A1-A3) made prominent by Tullock (1980), and often seen in the tournament
literature, initiated by Lazear and Rosen (1981). Other independent variables include a party
dummy indicating whether the candidate is a Democrat, the weighted CCCI index over all
classes of PACs as well as the CCCI indexes over each category of PAC, and variables
that control for the share of contributions a candidate received from the major classes of
contributors as defined by the Federal Election Commission. This latter category of variables
was mentioned earlier as being pertinent to testing Hypothesis #2.
Tables A1-A3 are voluminous and contain an overwhelming amount of information on
the effects of concentration on voteshare. To simplify interpretations we present first Figure
3. This figure is based on regressions similar to those in Table A1-A3 in all respects except
that the regressions behind Figure 3 contain only the weighted CCCI index over all classes of
PACs, and exclude the other more detailed measures of concentration. What the figure shows
is 95% confidence intervals for the regression coefficient attached to the weighted Herfindahl
index. The figure also shows the values of the CCCI regression coefficient. What emerges
is that the result of a negative relation between concentration and voteshare is confirmed and
even strengthened for challengers, and weakened for open seat candidates. For incumbents
a strong positive relation between concentration and voteshare emerges. 7
Figure 4 is similar to Figure 3 but is based on the full regressions shown in Tables A1-A3.
The confidence intervals in Figure 4 are not for a single concentration index regression
coefficient but rather for the group of concentration coefficients including all categories of
PAC as well as for the concentration index that covers all PACs. What we have done is
7Readers who note the larger number of incumbents than challengers from the regressions and are puzzled
may understand this by the phenomenon than in many southern states incumbents faced off against independent
challengers. Our sample analysed only the voteshares of Republicans and Democrats.20
to ask what is the marginal effect on voteshare of an equal increase in all concentration
coefficients simultaneously. We used the variance covariance matrix of each regression to
calculate the 95% confidence bands around this joint effect of an increase in all measures
of concentration. The results remain in the same direction as in Figure 3 and as in the case
of correlations. Challengers continue to show a negative (though weaker than in Figure 3)
relation between concentration and voteshare. As in Figure the relation is in doubt for open
seat candidates and continues to be positive for incumbents. 8
Tables A1-A3 also contains independent variables pertinent to Hypothesis 2, that the source
of funds may influence a candidate’s voteshare. We took the Federal Election Commission’s
classifications of corporate PAC contributions, contributions by individuals, contributions by
"public interest" groups. We excluded the fraction of money from a candidate’s own pocket to
avoid a singularity in the regression matrix. We then created variables that represent the share
of contributions a candidate received from each source. What emerges is that the coefficients
attached to these variables measuring the candidate’s reliance on a particular source have no
consistent sign over seven elections, and in many cases are statistically insignificant. This
is not entirely surprising, as these variables are based on FEC classifications of sources of
funds, and the categories of importance to voters need not coincide with those of the FEC.
For instance, the FEC draws a clear distinction between contributions by individuals and
contributions by PACs, yet PAC donations are bundles of money raised from individuals. To
voters contemplating where candidates get their funds, there may be no distinction to make
between PAC and individual contributions. If few voters care about the FEC classifications,
we should expect to see no consistent pattern or significance in the coefficients attached to
the source variables in the regressions of Tables A1-A3.
While any definite conclusions would be premature in view of the caveats above, the
robustness, using different statistical indicators, over so many elections of this relation
between concentration of contributions and challenger voteshares appears remarkable, and
worthy of further study. The evidence on open seat candidates is strong only in the case
8We should note that underlying Figure 4 is not quite the same mental experiment as that which would be
conducted in a joint significance test of all variables. ANOVA tests a hypothesis about joint significance where
our confidence bands measure a hypothesis about the sum of effects of variables. We have conducted ANOVA
on joint significance (not shown in the present paper) and report these largely confirm the findings in Figure 4.21
of simple correlations and disappears in multivariate analysis. The evidence on a negative
relation between concentration and voteshare for incumbents is non-existent in the case of
simple correlations, and in multivariate analysis a positive relation emerges. Is it possible
that these numbers suggest an U-shaped relation between concentration and votes as one
goes from challenger status, to open-seat status, and finally incumbent status? We have not
developed such a theory in the present paper. Our theory mainly seems to be confirmed
by the case of challengers, but the fact that a positive relation emerges, albeit weakly, for
incumbents, suggests that maybe our theory is a subset of a larger theory of the relation
between concentration and political support.
6. Conclusion
This paper has advanced the hypothesis that the sources of a candidate’s campaign
contributions may influence his or her voteshare. Raising this possibility challenges a central
doctrine in US campaign finance jurisprudence. In its 1976 Buckley v. Valeo decision, the
US Supreme Court held that campaign contributions (unlike campaign expenditures) were
not a form of speech meriting First Amendment protection. This paper has proposed several
theoretical mechanisms by which contributions may signal valuable information to voters.
The paper’s basic hypothesis was then tested using a new measure of the dispersion of
contributions. This measure, which we call the campaign contribution concentration index,
or CCCI, is analogous to the Herfindahl index of industry concentration familiar to students
of industrial organization. We found remarkably consistent evidence over seven US House
elections ranging from 1980 to 1992, that there is an inverse relationship between concentration
of contributions and the voteshare of challenging candidates, and weaker evidence of such
a relation for open-seat candidates. Surprisingly, we found evidence of a positive relation
between concentration and voteshare for incumbent candidates.
Although fundamental issues of causality remain to be addressed in future research,
our results raise important questions. The strong relationship between concentration of
contributions and a candidate’s voteshare further complicates the now quarter century-old
quest to disentangle the effects of campaign money on votes. Moreover, the possibility that
campaign contributions represent a form of "speech" challenges current legal doctrine. We22
believe that the results presented in this paper cast some doubt on the empirical premises
underlying the US Supreme Court’s 1976 view of the nature of political contributions. At
very least, our exploratory analysis has uncovered stylised facts about concentration and votes
not previously brought to prominence in the campaign finance literature.
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Source: FEC Data de-
scription booklets.TABLE 2A
Average size of PAC contribution, and Herfindahl measures of dispersion
Averagesize of contribution Herfindahl CCCI Index
Election Incumbent Challenger Open seat Incumbent Challenger Open seat
1980 684 871 1095 0.07 0.36 0.12
(340) (645) (504) (0.13) (0.35) (0.19)
1982 802 1131 1162 0.04 0.26 0.10
(314) (723) (367) (0.10) (0.29) (0.18)
1984 916 1533 1342 0.04 0.33 0.08
(329) (1162) (482) ( 0.10) ( 0.33) (0.12)
1986 1008 1396 1391 0.03 0.37 0.06
(334) (814) (515) (0.08) ( 0.33) ( 0.11)
1988 1151 1491 1633 0.03 0.42 0.08
(365) (1028) (691) (0.09) (0.36) (0.16)
1990 1279 1467 1679 0.03 0.43 0.05
(415) (1000) (529 (0.10) (0.36) (0.07)
1992 1446 1252 1486 .04 0.36 0.11
(430) (765) (519) ( 0.13) (0.34) (0.20)
Figures in brackets are standard deviations.
TABLE 2B
Components of CCCI = nσ
2 +1/n (standard deviation of PAC
contributions to candidates, and number of contributions)
averaged over each election.
Standard deviation of contributions σ Average number of contributions n
Election Incumbent Challenger Open seat Incumbent Challenger Open seat
1980 1009 1125 1492 103 32 70
(543) (750) (482) (59) (51) (56)
1982 1151 1497 1708 140 34 76
(543) (889) (600) (68) (43) (53)
1984 1236 1852 1812 157 34 98
(533) (1067) (658) (70) (51) (66)
1986 1303 1764 1840 170 24 104
(521) (1034) (598) (75) (33) (60)
1988 1444 1935 2141 175 21 104
(517) (1149) (775) (78) (31) (62)
1990 1513 1666 2109 168 20 105
(550) (974) (579) (76) (32) (57)
1992 1685 1490 1807 176 25 84
(520) (880) (665) (83) (34) (55)
Figures in brackets are standard deviations.TABLE 3
Correlations of weighted Herfindahl measures with voteshares
Election 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Incumbents
Herfindahl index over all committees × 0.18 ** 0.10 0.08 0.13 * 0.08 0.14 ** 0.22 **
committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over corporate committees × 0.23 ** 0.29 ** 0.24 ** 0.32 ** 0.28 ** 0.17 ** 0.23 **
corporate committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over labor committees × 0.02 0.22 ** 0.05 0.14 ** 0.16 ** 0.11 * 0.20 **
labor committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over trade committees × 0.26 ** 0.03 0.18 ** 0.14 ** 0.08 0.15 ** 0.16 **
trade committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over cooperative committees × -0.15 ** -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.11 * 0.04 0.11 *
cooperative committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over non-connected committees × -0.02 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.05 0.03
non-connected committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over without stock committees × -0.15 ** -0.02 -0.01 0.08 0.11 * 0.04 0.11 *
without stock committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over party committees × 0.06 -0.19 ** -0.08 -0.28 ** -0.23 ** -0.20 ** -0.33 **
party committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Challengers
Herfindahl index over all committees × -0.34 ** -0.25 ** -0.10 -0.29 ** -0.35 ** -0.14 ** -0.26 **
committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over corporate committees × -0.08 -0.16 ** -0.04 -0.09 -0.08 -0.13 -0.01
corporate committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over labor committees × -0.17 ** -0.05 -0.29 ** -0.10 -0.22 ** -0.05 -0.08
labor committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over trade committees × 0.10 0.08 -0.17 ** -0.06 0.20 ** -0.01 -0.05
trade committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over cooperative committees × 0.09 -0.15 ** -0.15 * -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02
cooperative committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over non-connected committees × 0.22 ** 0.30 ** 0.15 ** 0.25 ** 0.27 ** 0.09 0.21 **
non-connected committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over without stock committees × 0.09 -0.15 * -0.15 * -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.02
without stock committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over party committees × -0.11 -0.08 -0.04 -0.13 * -0.20 ** -0.11 -0.22 **
party committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Open seat candidates
Herfindahl index over all committees × -0.39 ** -0.24 * -0.44 ** -0.33 ** -0.49 ** -0.18 -0.39 **
committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over corporate committees × -0.39 ** -0.08 0.13 -0.24 ** -0.08 -0.14 -0.22 **
corporate committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over labor committees × 0.14 -0.18 -0.14 -0.18 -0.27 ** 0.13 0.12
labor committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over trade committees × -0.20 -0.17 -0.09 0.21 0.01 -0.07 -0.13
trade committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over cooperative committees × -0.24 ** -0.30 ** -0.14 -0.39 ** -0.03 0.19 -0.14
cooperative committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over non-connected committees × 0.33 ** 0.36 ** 0.33 * 0.33 ** 0.01 0.08 0.15
non-connected committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over without stock committees × -0.24 * -0.30 ** -0.14 -0.39 ** -0.03 0.19 -0.14
without stock committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
Herfindahl index over party committees × -0.47 ** -0.23 * -0.20 -0.18 -0.26 -0.36 ** -0.33 **
party committee contributions as fraction of total receipts
** stands for correlation significant at the 5% level. * stands for significance at the 10% level.TABLE A-1
Incumbent voteshare regressions
Election 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Constant 35 46 25 36 28 33 35
Democratic party dummy 0.73 11.12 1.50 5.70 3.04 1.23 -0.95
( 0.66 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.46 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.53 ) ( 0.55 )
Incumbent spending as 43 20 49 42 46 48 33
a fraction of all candidate spending ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
Fraction of contributions 3.01 -4.57 0.27 -6.01 2.79
from individuals ( 0.62 ) ( 0.50 ) ( 0.97 ) ( 0.40 ) 0.63 )
Fraction of contributions -91 -81 -16 -309 82 -15 -344
from party ( 0.05 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.83 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.54 ) ( 0.95 ) ( 0.05 )
Fraction of contributions from -7.19 -5.03 -8.20 -20 0.21 -27 1.38
corporate committees ( 0.47 ) ( 0.64 ) ( 0.44 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.99 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.89 )
Fraction of contributions from -10 -19 -7.98 -28 -2.57 -21 -7.85
labor committees ( 0.12 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.34 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.82 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.45 )
Fraction of contributions from 3.74 21 15 15 3.48 -5.20 4.68
trade committees ( 0.73 ) ( 0.16 ) ( 0.30 ) ( 0.29 ) ( 0.81 ) ( 0.74 ) ( 0.71 )
Fraction of contributions from -57 -122 -14 -29 -30 -43 -49
cooperative committees ( 0.37 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.80 ) ( 0.60 ) ( 0.69 ) ( 0.60 ) ( 0.46 )
Fraction of contributions from -127 -203.68 -65 -64 -125 -126 -131
non-connected committees ( 0.03 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
Fraction of contributions from corporations -51 345 166 -51 88 166 -50
without stock committees ( 0.81 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.20 ) ( 0.60 ) ( 0.35 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.60 )
(Herfindahl index over all committees) × 70 130 -8 165 134 -129 336
(committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.15 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.95 ) ( 0.34 ) ( 0.54 ) ( 0.31 ) ( 0.23 )
(Herfindahl index over corporate committees) × 253 478 236 905 270 292 332
(corporate committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.46 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.41 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.34 )
(Herfindahl index over labor committees) × -14 81 -31 151 13 136 280
(labor committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.78 ) ( 0.33 ) ( 0.78 ) ( 0.29 ) ( 0.92 ) ( 0.35 ) ( 0.10 )
(Herfindahl index over trade committees) × 116 -62 185 20 40 384 -182
(trade committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.66 ) ( 0.14 ) ( 0.87 ) ( 0.85 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.34 )
(Herfindahl index over cooperative committees) × 48 206 -15 44 70 18 156
(cooperative committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.71 ) ( 0.21 ) ( 0.91 ) ( 0.79 ) ( 0.78 ) ( 0.94 ) ( 0.48 )
(Herfindahl index over non-connected committees) × 165 447 245 256 436 351 100
(non-connected committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.57 )
(Herfindahl index over without stock committees) × -37 -437 -272 233 -92.98 -81 154
(without stock committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.91 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.40 ) ( 0.33 ) ( 0.71 ) ( 0.68 ) ( 0.37 )
(Herfindahl index over party committees) × 66 49 10 176 -161 -106 96
(party committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.23 ) ( 0.42 ) ( 0.91 ) ( 0.28 ) ( 0.39 ) ( 0.76 ) ( 0.71 )
Dummy for southern states 2.41 1.60 3.16 2.70 4.17 2.75 -0.79
( 0.10 ) ( 0.32 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.15 ) ( 0.60 )
Dummy for western states -3.61 -0.98 -1.20 -3.61 -0.18 -6.41 -2.32
( 0.02 ) ( 0.58 ) ( 0.47 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.92 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.15 )
Dummy for eastern states -1.37 -1.42 -1.51 1.76 3.73 -2.02 1.96
( 0.35 ) ( 0.37 ) ( 0.35 ) ( 0.24 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.31 ) ( 0.22 )
R
2
0.57 0.46 0.51 0.53 0.45 0.33 0.39
F 26.5 16.7 20.3 21.9 16.7 10.1 11.7
Degrees of freedom 363 351 369 362 378 365 317
The symbol n.a. stands for not applicable. The 1980 and 1982 datasets did not include information on contributions from
individuals.TABLE A-2
Challenger voteshare regressions
Election 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Constant 24 26 25 21 26 32 28
Democratic party dummy 0.22 10.33 -2.68 2.97 -0.86 1.69 2.26
( 0.88 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.41 ) ( 0.19 ) ( 0.09 )
Challenger spending as 28 13 28 20 19 2.26 29
a fraction of all candidate spending ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.36 ) ( 0.00 )
Fraction of contributions n.a. n.a. ( 3.10) ( 3.59) ( 3.83 ) ( 3.90 ) ( 1.66 )
from individuals ( n.a. ( n.a. ) 0.12 ) 0.05 ) 0.02 ) 0.06 ) 0.45 )
Fraction of contributions 31 33 7.55 16 32 24 22
from party ( 0.01 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.41 ) ( 0.41 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.40 ) ( 0.44 )
Fraction of contributions 6.88 27 28 82 18 11 54
from corporate committees ( 0.57 ) ( 0.17 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.33 ) ( 0.62 ) ( 0.00 )
Fraction of contributions 22 12 6.55 20 8.87 9.64 7.25
from labor committees ( 0.00 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.18 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.22 )
Fraction of contributions 30 57 2.41 50 46 102 2.74
from trade committees ( 0.10 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.89 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.87 )
Fraction of contributions 11 409 671 -308 -384 -428 196
from cooperative committees ( 0.96 ) ( 0.24 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.46 ) ( 0.40 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.70 )
Fraction of contributions 54 4.76 28 12 70 84 12
from non-connected committees ( 0.01 ) ( 0.76 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.34 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.72 )
Fraction of contributions 2211 2195 -710 -352 -50 789 540
from corporations without stock committees ( 0.04 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.24 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.49 ) ( 0.37 ) ( 0.02 )
(Herfindahl index over all committees) × -5.02 -18 3.29 0.44 -2.39 32 -13
(committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.85 ) ( 0.40 ) ( 0.68 ) ( 0.96 ) ( 0.84 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.56 )
(Herfindahl index over corporate committees) × 15 -37 -29 -45 -70 -69 -24
(corporate committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.73 ) ( 0.43 ) ( 0.40 ) ( 0.18 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.46 )
(Herfindahl index over labor committees) × -35 -40 -17 -24 -9.90 -42 -12
(labor committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.25 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.43 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.67 )
(Herfindahl index over trade committees) × -49 -74 -6.42 -64 -27 -141 -12
(trade committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.30 ) ( 0.07 ) ( 0.77 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.50 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.69 )
(Herfindahl index over cooperative committees) × 448 -173 -631 634 493 622 -216
(cooperative committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.30 ) ( 0.65 ) ( 0.08 ) ( 0.30 ) ( 0.57 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.71 )
(Herfindahl index over non-connected committees) × -29 -50 -39 -11 -96 -117 15
(non-connected committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.46 ) ( 0.10 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.56 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.73 )
(Herfindahl index over without stock committees) × -2741 -2175 1018 334 90 -816 -527
(without stock committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.02 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.13 ) ( 0.52 ) ( 0.35 ) ( 0.02 )
(Herfindahl index over party committees) × -36 -19 -10 -12 -36 -56 -36
(party committee contributions as fraction of total receipts) ( 0.25 ) ( 0.48 ) ( 0.41 ) ( 0.60 ) ( 0.06 ) ( 0.11 ) ( 0.36 )
Dummy for southern states 0.25 0.64 2.24 2.66 1.54 2.56 0.75
( 0.84 ) ( 0.60 ) ( 0.04 ) ( 0.01 ) ( 0.09 ) ( 0.03 ) ( 0.53 )
Dummy for western states 1.29 -2.15 -0.11 0.92 -1.98 1.40 -1.70
( 0.32 ) ( 0.12 ) ( 0.93 ) ( 0.40 ) ( 0.05 ) ( 0.28 ) ( 0.22 )
Dummy for eastern states 0.69 -1.25 1.62 1.17 0.52 1.70 -1.43
( 0.59 ) ( 0.33 ) ( 0.15 ) ( 0.28 ) ( 0.62 ) ( 0.24 ) ( 0.27 )
R
2
0.58 0.54 0.58 0.54 0.56 0.33 0.53
F 19.3 17.1 20.1 15.1 16.9 18.7 17.2
Degrees of freedom 248 255 260 222 235 187 276
The symbol n.a. stands for not applicable. The 1980 and 1982 datasets did not include information on contributions from
individuals.TABLE A-3
Open seat candidate voteshare regressions
Election 1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992
Constant 38 27 17 8.53 22 14 18
Democratic party dummy 4.33 9.64 -0.62 9.78 5.18 6.68 -3.95
( 0.47 ) ( 0.03 ) (0.92 ) (0.01 ) (0.40 ) (0.26 ) ( 0.20 )
Open seat candidate spending as 24 21 52 44 39 38 36
a fraction of all candidate spending (0.01 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 )
Fraction of contributions n.a. n.a. 19 25 14 30 14
from individuals (n.a.) (n.a.) (0.09) (0.00) (0.24) ( 0.01) (0.01)
Fraction of contributions 43 72 43 -103 71 164 -26
from party (0.52 ) (0.32 ) (0.68 ) (0.26 ) (0.47 ) (0.08 ) ( 0.76 )
Fraction of contributions from 47 29 -3.41 75 5.44 7.48 40
corporate committees (0.38 ) (0.43 ) (0.94 ) (0.11 ) (0.93 ) (0.90 ) ( 0.07 )
Fraction of contributions from -19 21 -8 -3 6 10 48
labor committees (0.51 ) (0.12 ) (0.65 ) (0.86 ) (0.84 ) (0.76 ) ( 0.00 )
Fraction of contributions from -27 106 -1.13 3.85 40 23 0.88
trade committees (0.61 ) (0.01 ) (0.98 ) (0.95 ) (0.54 ) (0.70 ) ( 0.97 )
Fraction of contributions from -361 -5.15 205 367 491 316 -325
cooperative committees (0.41 ) (0.99 ) (0.73 ) (0.33 ) (0.41 ) (0.54 ) ( 0.45 )
Fraction of contributions from 49 -55 -5.57 22 -218 -101 63
non-connected committees (0.56 ) (0.19 ) (0.92 ) (0.64 ) (0.01 ) (0.22 ) ( 0.28 )
Fraction of contributions from corporations -2183 741 795 -1582 48 -584 -340
without stock committees (0.30 ) (0.31 ) (0.52 ) (0.01 ) (0.96 ) (0.4 ) ( 0.35 )
Herfindahl index over all committees × 184 48 86 167 -145 170 -66
committee contributions as fraction of total receipts (0.20 ) (0.54 ) (0.59 ) (0.31 ) (0.58 ) (0.65 ) ( 0.47 )
Herfindahl index over corporate committees × -273 151 2591 -2061 -1020 -1268 29
corporate committee contributions as fraction of total receipts (0.45 ) (0.49 ) ( 0.00 ) (0.01 ) (0.31 ) (0.09 ) ( 0.87 )
Herfindahl index over labor committees × 77 -125 -0.76 -123 -273 -126 41
labor committee contributions as fraction of total receipts (0.60 ) (0.14 ) (.99 ) (0.31 ) (0.29 ) (0.59 ) ( 0.70 )
Herfindahl index over trade committees × -159 -370 39 81 315 -264 -75
trade committee contributions as fraction of total receipts (0.35 ) (0.01 ) (0.82 ) (0.73 ) (0.38 ) (0.49 ) ( 0.18 )
Herfindahl index over cooperative committees × 1028 799 -475 238 -789 -276 106
cooperative committee contributions as fraction of total receipts (0.22 ) (0.21 ) (0.69 ) (0.72 ) (0.27 ) (0.78 ) ( 0.91 )
Herfindahl index over non-connected committees × -100 -168 -59 -63 1783 1354 -2.04
non-connected committee contributions as fraction of total receipts ( 0.41 ) ( 0.30 ) ( 0.86 ) ( 0.82 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.00 ) ( 0.99 )
Herfindahl index over without stock committees × 2794 -648 -2037 2476 -624 788 392
without stock committee contributions as fraction of total receipts (0.2 ) (0.4 ) (0.23 ) (0.03 ) (0.57 ) (0.63 ) ( 0.31 )
Herfindahl index over party committees × -264 -108 -252 167 -155 -395 12
party committee contributions as fraction of total receipts (0.1 ) (0.35 ) (0.13 ) (0.27 ) (0.41 ) (0.03 ) ( 0.94 )
Dummy for southern states -4.05 -2.07 -6.4 0.18 0.23 1.45 3.74
(0.33 ) (0.6 ) (0.06 ) (0.95 ) (0.96 ) (0.7 ) ( 0.13 )
Dummy for western states -5.2 3.23 -4.11 0.86 8.17 -3.11 -1.18
(0.33 ) (0.43 ) (0.36 ) (0.75 ) (0.22 ) (0.51 ) ( 0.64 )
Dummy for eastern states -0.29 2.05 -4.95 0.13 0.81 -2.34 1.55
(0.94 ) (0.67 ) (0.22 ) (0.97 ) (0.88 ) (0.58 ) ( 0.62 )
R
2
0.46 0.45 0.63 0.72 0.54 0.59 0.58
F 3.9 5.1 5.4 10.36 4.09 4.5 10.5
Degrees of freedom 48 80 33 55 33 31 122
The symbol n.a. stands for not applicable. The 1980 and 1982 datasets did not include information on contributions from
























Incumbent 0.18 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.08 0.
Challenger -0.34 -0.25 -0.10 -0.29 -0.35 -0
Open seat -0.39 -0.24 -0.44 -0.33 -0.49 -0














































nFigure 2(c): Open seat candidate correlati





































UPPER  180 356 241 633 435 400 821 -16 -38 0 -2 -9 -5 -9 74 95 255
LOWER  62 129 -59 261 86 -6 306 -57 -80 -17 -27 -29 -22 -52 -159 -81 -242
MEAN 121 242 91 447 260 197 563 -37 -59 -9 -15 -19 -14 -30 -42 7 7
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 80 82 84











UPPER 1388 1585 1113 2726 1543 1833 2094 -110 -551 1775 2040 2064 1060 384 7755 1530 3
MEAN 676 909 332 1935 712 873 1245 -2552 -2572 275 809 344 -619 -858 3287 -421 5
LOWER -35 233 -449 1145 -120 -87 395 -4993 -4593 -1225 -422 -1377 -2298 -2100 -1182 -2373 -
80 82 84 86 88 90 92 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 80 82
INCUMBENT CHALLENGER